No.96, September/October 2022

　　The past few years have seen China-US relations at a low ebb since the establishment of diplomatic ties, and the crux boils down to how the United States perceives China, the world and itself. The sound and stable growth of the bilateral relationship depends on whether the two countries could put their differences in perspective and get on to pursue their respective and common interests. Mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation are an important conclusion informed by the evolution of China-US relations over the past 50-odd years. They are also the right way for major countries to live with each other in this era.

　　

　　Over the past three decades, China and the ROK have established close economic ties and a strategic cooperative partnership. Amid dynamic regional circumstances and policy changes of the new ROK government, the bilateral relationship is facing new challenges. As close neighbors, the two sides should maintain the positive momentum of their economic ties, strategic cooperation and social support with a long-term perspective, and infuse their relations with new meaning based on new consensus and new forms of cooperation.

　　

　　BRICS cooperation has become an important platform for emerging markets and developing economies to deepen international cooperation and participate in global governance, playing an irreplaceable role in enhancing their representation and voice. By integrating participants' pursuit of interests with an institutional framework and an action-oriented approach, the BRICS mode of global governance provides important inspirations for the reform and further development of the global governance system.

　　

　　The American foreign policy is under crisis, as the relative decline of US power makes it unable to maintain the liberal international order on a global scale. A shrinking middle class, a failing governance system, and creeping irrationality across the society are all hollowing out the domestic basis of the US-led order. Despite his recent gains from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Biden's efforts to revitalize American democracy and unite more allies and partners are far from a settlement of all problems facing the US, let alone an end to the crisis.

　　

　　Driven by its mindset and preferences formed during the Cold War, NATO's eastward expansion in the post-Cold War era has paved the way for the escalation of US-Europe's friction with Russia and a new round of great-power competition. As the competition with Russia and the Russia-Ukraine conflict are put under control, NATO has both the capability and the willingness to engage in the US strategic competition with China, but there are apparently several constraints. Through its own development and strategy, China is able to keep NATO's military and security participation at a low level.

　　

　　Compared with the EU's previous connectivity plans, the Global Gateway continues the "hard power" framework, but also stresses the "soft power" in exporting ideology, rules and standards, and democratic values. With no lack of content that positions China as an implicit target, the Global Gateway can hardly align with China's Belt and Road Initiative in the short term. Despite prominent constraints to its implementation, its impacts on China's Belt and Road Initiative are highly likely and deserve further study.

　　

　　Recognizing that it cannot strengthen ties with Asia-Pacific countries based solely on military and security cooperation, the US launched the IPEF to make up for its absence in the regional economic cooperation architecture, dilute China's economic clout in the region and reshape America's dominant position in the Asia-Pacific economy and trade. While the framework may put China's foreign cooperation network in a more challenging position, it will neither replace current economic cooperation frameworks, nor does it possess the leverage to contain China.