China-Africa Governance Exchanges and Experiences

FOCAC 2015 A New Beginning of China-Africa Relations, 2015, pp.80-106 | 作者: Zeng Aiping | 时间: 2015-12-03 | 责编: Wang Jiapei
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Zeng Aiping[1]

 

Introduction

The exchange on governance experiences is relatively new under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and can be traced back to the late 1990s in the context of China’s economic rise and expansion.It was not until 2006 that the exchange of governing experiences formally became one of the priority areas of FOCAC. Due to it being a new area of interaction, there is a lack of literature, as this area is not well researched by scholars. Therefore, this chapter tries to make the best use of China’s public documents and materials to review the process of China-Africa exchanges on governance and the implications for the development of Africa. The methodology utilised in this section consists of literature research and case studies. The author tries to establish empirical data and historical facts in the related area and formulate explanations.The definition of governance, in the Chinese context, is not confined to political systems. It is considered as a comprehensive and systematic governing process which relates to the management of all aspects of state affairs including, but not limited to, the politics, economy, infrastructure, industrialization, education, agriculture, poverty reduction, and rural development. This chapter uses the concept of governance under the context of Chinese discourse, since it focuses on the China-Africa governance exchanges from a Chinese perspective.

China’s economic success since the reform and opening-up in 1978 is one of the most outstanding achievements in the history of humans. China is the second largest economy in the world and has uplifted most of its 1.3 billion population out of poverty, marching toward the goal of establishing a moderately prosperous society by the middle of twenty-first century. For most African countries, China’s experiences of development are inspiring and deserve to be emulated in terms of governance of national affairs. The China-Africa exchanges on governing experiences should be contextualized in this historical background.

Since the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, at least 27 government agencies have joined the Chinese follow-up action committee of FOCAC.[2] This chapter will select some key Chinese members of the FOCAC action committee to illustrate and examine their experiences and exchanges with African counterparts. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs(MFA), Commerce (MOFCOM) and Finance are three core components of the FOCAC follow-up committee.[3] Other Chinese institutions, such as the International Department of Central Committee of CPC (Communist Party of China), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education, National Development and Reform Commission, and some financial institutions, also play important roles in promoting the Sino-African governance exchanges. Generally, different government agencies are responsible, in their respective areas of authority, for sharing experiences sharing with African counterparts through training seminars designed to promote professional development for better administration. 

Training programmes and mutual official visits are the main tools China utilises to communicate the governing experience with African participants. Almost all the Chinese ministries that participate in the governance exchanges with African countries deliver training classes and workshops to African officials or professionals.  It is beyond the scope of this article to explore each category of the numerous workshops organised by the various Chinese governmental agencies; instead it aims to: introduce the practices of several key governmental agencies; explain the dynamics of the China-Africa exchange on governance experiences; China’s non-interference policy; analyse the Chinese governance model and the possibility of its application in Africa.

Apart from the introduction, the chapter consists of five parts. First, it discusses the general practices of some members of the Chinese follow-up committee of FOCAC in their perspective areas of engagements with African countries. The ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Education and others are the main objects of research. Second, it selects inter-party relations between China and Africa to highlight the governing experience exchanges. According to the function division of the Chinese follow-up committee of FOCAC, the International Department of the Central Committee of CPC is in charge of the governance experience exchanges with African countries. It plays an important coordinating role to promote governance engagement between China and Africa. Third, the relationship between the governance experience exchanges and China’s non-interference policy is examined, with China-South Sudan relations used as a case study. Fourth, the chapter explores China’s governance model and its applicability in Africa, with agriculture and poverty reduction as the focus of analysis. The author concludes the chapter with some recommendations for further development of China-Africa exchanges on governance experiences under the FOCAC framework.

The Practices of MOFCOM, MFA and Other Chinese Government Agencies

The MOFCOM Practice

In August 1998, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), (then Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation) organised the first training workshop for African officials in charge of economic administration.[4] Twenty-two participants from twelve African countries attended the training class, which was themed by promoting Sino-African communications of the successful experiences and measures in respective economic construction. The Chinese presenters focused on sharing the experiences of China’s reform and opening-up policy, and its concrete measures and achievements.[5] Since then, the MOFCOM has repeated the training annually and has gradually expanded the training courses to include, among others, economic administration, trade and investment, city planning and administration, transportation, construction of development zones.

In September 2002, the MOFCOM upgraded its programme by organising its first ministerial level training class for twelve African countries. The training courses mainly touched on the following from a senior government level perspective: China’s economic management, reform and development in Chinese rural areas, and China’s foreign trade and economic cooperation.[6] The workshops organised by the MOFOCOM serve the purpose of boosting China-African economic and trade cooperation, and the exchange of governance experience in the field of economic management has been an integral part of the training programmes.

It should be noted that despite the various official languages in Africa such as Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, and many others. MOFCOM has promoted effective communication by organising targeted training workshops inclusive of participants from related African countries.

MFA’s Impact

With regard to the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it entrusted China’s Foreign Affairs University to deliver training courses targeting African diplomats. From1996 to2004, the China Foreign Affairs University organised nine workshops for African diplomats, to help them better understand modern China.[7] Furthermore, it held two workshops for the Arabic speaking Northern African countries in 2001 and 2004.[8] The workshops offered diverse courses, including Chinese history, culture, economy, society and diplomacy, which were helpful in providing attendees with a panoramic picture of China.[9] However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has gone beyond training workshops and plays an important role in coordinating the China-Africa exchanges of views and experiences on governance which developed through the FOCAC Beijing Summit.

The FOCAC Beijing Summit held in 2006 was a watershed moment in terms of exchange of governing experiences between China and Africa. The 2006 Declaration of Beijing Summit of FOCAC committed both sides to increase the exchange of views on governance and development, to learn from each other, to make common progress and to enhance respective capacity for self-development.[10] In addition, the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) pointed out that the two sides agreed to set up a mechanism for regular political consultation between the foreign ministers of both regions within the FOCAC framework. It was also decided that in the year following each FOCAC Ministerial Conference, foreign ministers from both regions would hold political consultations in New York, as a sideline event to the UN General Assembly, to exchange views on major issues of common interest.[11] Consequently, the Chinese and African foreign ministers have held three political consultations on promoting governance in New York, i.e. on: 26 September 2007, 23 September 2010, and 23 September 2013.[12]

Education and Health Exchanges

Education is fundamental for a country’s development and prosperity and both education and health are vital in promoting human resource development. At the first ministerial conference of FOCAC in 2000, China decided to establish the African Human Resources Development Fund, gradually increase its financial contribution to the Human Resources Development Fund for the training of African professionals in different disciplines.[13] Being fully aware of the vital importance of skills training and capacity building to sustainable development in Africa, both China and Africa have increased performance-based and result-specific cooperation in human resources development.

In the educational area, China’s Ministry of Education has been proactive in sharing with its African counterparts how to develop human resources in respective countries. Since the 1990s, the Ministry of Education has strengthened its efforts to cultivate African talents for the purpose of providing intellectual support to Sino-African cooperation. It has organised numerous workshops in China for training African educational officials, scholars, engineers and technicians in a broad range of disciplines, such as distance learning, vocational and technological education, agro-industry, computer science, economic management and herbal medicine.[14] Through these training courses, the African participants not only acquired professional knowledge, but also deepened their understanding of China’s politics, economy, history and culture.

In the domain of demography and development, China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission (the combined former Ministry of Health and the former National Population and Family Commission) has organised at least seven training and communication workshops for African officials in charge of health and demographic affairs.[15] These workshops are designed to inform the African counterparts of Chinese practical experiences on family planning, poverty reduction, maternal and child health, and improve African countries’ capacity to deal with the issues of population increase, disease and high mortality in pregnant women and children.[16]

Reform Exchanges

Apart from the multitude of training classes, Chinese government organs and financial institutions actively support international conferences on China-Africa poverty reduction and development. Some of these seminars have been sponsored by the World Bank and other international institutions. At these sessions, Chinese participants shared their views with African delegates on China’s development experiences. In October 2000, the FOCAC held a conference entitled The China-Africa Exchange of Reform Experiences, at which the representatives from China, Botswana, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritius made presentations.[17] Zeng Peiyan, Minister of the former State Development Planning Commission (now National Development and Reform Commission), made a keynote speech about the reform of Chinese economic regime, in which he summed up the main successful experiences of China’s economic reform. He attributed four combinations to the relatively smooth reform with Chinese characteristics. First, China follows the incremental approach in reform with breakthrough in some key areas, such as in the agriculture sector. Second, China’s economic reform is market-oriented, but the government attaches importance to the macro-economic control. Third, it combines the internal reform and opening-up to the outside world. Fourth, it pays attention the balances among reform, development and stability..[18]

Zeng Peiyan emphasised the last point, i.e. the balances among reform, development and stability. Maintaining stability is a top priority and precondition of development and reform. Development on the other hand, is the absolute necessity and holds the key for solving all the Chinese problems. Then finally, reform liberates and develops productivity, providing strong impetus for furthering social and economic development.[19]China’s achievements in political and economic construction lie in the good balance between stability, reform and development, which has turned into what is referred as a virtuous circle in its domestic development.

In October 2003, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the African Development Bank (ADB) jointly held a conference on China-Africa Economic Reform and Development Strategy, inviting twenty-two high-level economic and financial officials from sixteen African countries, seven officials of ADB, and sixteen Chinese representatives from PBC and other national ministries and commissions.[20] The Chinese presenters highlighted: domestic reforms; strategies and policies in various economic sectors, such as China’s economic reform and development; China’s accession into World Trade Organization(WTO); reform of the Chinese foreign exchange system; Chinese finance and monetary policy; China’s agriculture development and poverty reduction programmes, etc.[21]In addition to the academic discussion, the organisers arranged field trips for the participants to visit Shanghai Pudong Development Zone and some poverty alleviation projects in China. In May 2008, PBC and ADB co-organised another seminar, in Maputo Mozambique, focusing on China-Africa Experience Sharing on Development of Rural Finance.[22]

China and the World Bank(WB) initiated a high-level series of seminars, titled China-Africa Sharing Development Experiences, which have been held consecutively for four years (2008 to 2011) in Beijing. These assist African countries to better understand China’s experiences and facilitate poverty reduction in Africa. Each focused on a specific theme, i.e. agriculture and rural development, land and water resource management, economic development zones, infrastructure construction, and the cultivation of a viable environment for entrepreneurship.[23] The field studies allowed African participants visit both developed (Shanghai, Dongguan city of Guangdong Province and Zhejiang province) and undeveloped areas(the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, etc.) in China.

China-Africa Party-to-Party Exchanges

As the ruling party of China, CPC attaches importance to the exchange of governance experiences with its African counterparts. In1978, the CPC began to shake off the constraints of ideology and establish relations, not only with communist parties, but also with non-communist ones in Africa.[24] In 1982, the 12th National Congress of CPC put forward four new principles (independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs) to guide its party diplomacy, so as to establish a new type of inter-party relations with all possible partners around the world. As long as the opposite side (ruling party or not), adheres to these four principles, the CPC is willing to develop official relations with it and implement cooperation. This ushers in a new era for China’s party diplomacy in Africa. To date, more than 81 African political parties have entered formal relations with CPC.[25]

Regarding the exchange of governance experiences in the party-to-party relations, this section focuses on CPC’s cooperation with its African counterparts during the period 1998-2014. The main source of data and literature are from the official website of the International Department of CPC Central Committee. The statistical results show that the CPC and African political parties have close interactions, which are evidenced by the frequent visits (see Table 4.1 and 4.2) and various forms of engagement(Tables 4.3 – 4.6).

Table4.1: Top 25 African countries visited by CPC delegations (1998-2014)[26]

No.

Country

Name

Party Name

Number of CPC

delegation

Total

1

South Africa

African National Congress

15

21

Communist Party

6

2

Zimbabwe

African National Union-Patriotic Front

14

14

3

Sudan

National Congress Party

13

13

4

Ethiopia

People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

13

13

5

Tunisia

Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique

13

13

6

Tanzania

Chama Cha Mapinduzi

12

12

7

Kenya

 

African National Union

3

10

Party of National Unity; Orange Democratic Movement; Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya

7

8

Egypt

National Democratic Party

9

10

New Wafd Party

1

9

Namibia

South West African People’s Organization

9

9

10

Morocco

 

 

Union Socialiste des Forces Populaire

5

9

Parti de I’Istiqlal

3

Parti de la Justice et du Développement

1

11

Mauritius

Labour Party

9

9

12

Zambia

 

The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

6

8

The Patriotic Front

2

13

Algeria

Front de Libération Nationale; Rassemblement National Démocratique; Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix

7

7

14

Angola

Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola

7

7

15

Seychelles

The People’s Progressive Front; People’s Party

7

7

16

Mozambique

Partido Frelimo

6

6

17

Uganda

The National Resistance Movement Organization

6

6

18

Rwanda

Patriotic Front

5

5

19

Cape Verde

Partido Africano da Independência

4

5

Movimento para a Democracia

1

20

Gabon

Le Parti Démocratique

4

4

21

Mali

Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali-Parti African pour la Solidarité et la Justice

4

4

22

Botswana

Democratic Party

4

4

23

Congo (Democratic)

Le Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie

4

4

24

South Sudan

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

4

4

25

Senegal

Parti Démocratique Sénégalais

2

4

Alliance Pour la République

2

Source: the official website of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC

 

Table 4.2: Top 28 African countries sending party delegations to visit CPC (1998-2014)[27]

No.

African Country

African Parties

Number of Delegations to China

Total

1

South Africa

 

African National Congress

13

27

Communist Party

14

2

Sudan

National Congress Party

19

19

3

Tanzania

Chama Cha Mapinduzi

10

10

4

Zimbabwe

African National Union-Patriotic Front

10

10

5

Namibia

South West African People’s Organization

9

9

6

Morocco

 

 

 

Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme

3

9

Parti de I’Istiqlal

3

Union Socialiste des Forces Populaire

2

Governing coalition multi-party delegation

1

7

Ethiopia

The People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

9

9

8

Mozambique

Partido Frelimo

8

8

9

Burundi

 

 

 

 

 

Comité National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie

6

8

Le Parti de l’Unité pour le Progrès National

1

Front pour la Démocratique au Burundi

1

10

Rwanda

Rwandan Patriotic Front

6

6

11

Cape Verde

 

 

Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde

5

6

Movimento para a Democracia

1

12

Senegal

 

 

 

Parti Démocratique Sénégalais

3

6

Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme

1

Alliance Pour la République

2

13

Lesotho

Lesotho Congress for Democracy

5

5

14

Angola

Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola

5

5

15

Niger

 

 

 

Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement-Nassara

3

5

Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme-Tarayya

1

Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme

1

16

Kenya

 

 

 

Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya

2

5

Orange Democratic Movement

1

Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya

1

Jubilee Coalition Alliance(consisting of the National Alliance Party, United Republican Party, National Rainbow Coalition, and Republic Congress Party)

1

17

South Sudan

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

5

5

18

Nigeria

People’s Democratic Party

4

4

19

Congo (Democratic)

Le Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie

4

4

20

Guinea Equatorial

Partido Democratico De Guinea Ecuatorial

4

4

21

Uganda

The National Resistance Movement Organization

4

4

22

Djibouti

Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès

4

4

23

Gabon

Parti Démocratique Gabonais

4

4

24

Togo

The Rally of the Togolese People

4

4

25

Zambia

 

The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

2

4

The Patriotic Front

2

26

Tunisia

 

 

Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique

3

4

Mouvement Ennahdha

1

27

Mauritania

 

Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social

3

4

Union des Forces du Progrès

1

28

Mali

 

 

 

Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali-Parti African pour la Solidarité et la Justice

2

4

Union Malienne Pour la République et la Démocratie

1

Le Rassemblement pour le Mali

1

Source: the official website of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC

 

In sum, during the past 17 years, the CPC has forged links with 48 African countries. The same number of African countries has sent party delegations to visit the CPC. The mutual party visits between the CPC and the ruling parties from South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Morocco, and Ethiopia qualify as having the highest frequency of visits, while in other cases the African parties have sent only one or two delegations to visit the CPC, and vice versa. This shows that all inter-party relations are not at the same level as others. 

In bilateral engagement, the CPC usually highlights the following points. First, the ruling party bears the responsibilities of safeguarding internal stability, concentrating on economic construction, and improving the people’s living standards. The CPC holds that strengthening China-Africa inter-party communication and cooperation, and mutually learning about the other side’s strong points to offset one’s own weaknesses, would be beneficial for both sides to improve party building and fulfil their responsibilities.

Second, the CPC always commits itself to adherence to the four principles (independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs) in inter-party relations with African counterparts. Third, African countries should attach great importance to developing productivity as a means for transformation of the poor and their disadvantaged state. China’s experiences show that it is extremely important to deal with reform, development and stability. Without a stable domestic environment, it is not possible to develop and construct the country. Fourth, the CPC supports African parties in independently determining and selecting the appropriate political system and development road to build their countries, based on their own domestic circumstances and without foreign interference. The CPC also supports Africa in promoting Pan-Africanism and the continental integration process, believing that African countries can only rid themselves of the negative legacies of their history and overcome current difficulties and challenges through unity and solidarity.

Fifth, the ruling party should strengthen its own capacity building, especially in the areas of cadres training, organisation and discipline construction. In addition, the CPC usually uses the mutual visits to inform the Africans of a wide range of subjects of mutual concern, such as China’s National People’s Congress System, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference System, the resolutions of the CPC’s National Congress, the Chinese socialist market economy, China’s new rural construction efforts, and the deepening process of reform and opening-up in China.

Apart from the bilateral exchanges, the CPC has also developed other types of communication to increase China-Africa exchanges in the area of governance.  First, during the years 1998-2009, the CPC frequently invited the ruling parties of African countries to form joint delegations to visit China. The delegation members mainly consist of middle or high-level party officials, the representatives of the Youth League of the ruling parties, and others (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Ruling parties of African countries that have dispatched joint delegations to China

Time of visit

Number of Ruling Parties

Participating Countries

October-November1998

5

Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea

May 2001

11

Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda

May 2002

12

Guinea-Bissau,Cameroon,Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Congo,Gabon, Guinea,EquatorialGuinea, Mali,Niger,Rwanda,Togo

September 2003

Unknown

The head of the joint delegation wasfrom The Democratic Party of Gabon, but other participating countries are unknown.

November 2004

5

Congo, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Togo

June 2005

9

Cameroon, Djibouti,Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo

June 2006

11

Burundi,Cameroon,Congo,Djibouti,Guinea,Mauritius, Niger,Rwanda,Togo,Gabon,Chad

July 2007

4

Djibouti, Niger,Chad,Togo

July 2007

2

The representatives of the party newspaper of the ruling party of Namibia and Tanzania

January 2008

9

Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Gabon, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Togo

June 2009

3

The representatives of the party newspaper of the ruling party of Namibia, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone

Sourcethe official website of the International Department of Central Committee of CPC, and other online materials

Second, against the backdrop of the 2008 global financial crisis, many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in China, West Asia and North Africa, were in difficulty. To cope with the crisis and strengthen the cooperation between SMEs in China and the region, the CPC hosted a series of conferences to exchange ideas and experiences. Almost all the North African countries and some sub-Saharan African countries sent representatives of the ruling party and SMEs to attend the forum. The inter-party dialogue mechanism offered another platform for both sides to jointly deal with economic challenges (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4: China-West Asia and North Africa Cooperation Forum on SMEs (2009-2013)

No.

Date

Venue

Theme

1

June 2009

Ningbo  city,

Zhejiang Province

For SMEs dealing with the crisis, the inter-party contact offers an alternative platform

2

October2011

Weifang city,

Shandong Province

To seek mutual beneficial and win-win development, SMEs having a role to play

3

July2012

Tianjin city

How to make best use of the advantages of SMEs

4

June 2013

Changzhou city,

Jiangsu Province

SMEs versus economic and social development

Source: the official website of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC

Apart from hosting the series forum on SMEs, the International Department of Central Committee of CPC and the Ministry of Agriculture of China co-organised the first China-Africa Forum on Agricultural Cooperation in Beijing on 11--12 August 2010, to which more than 130 representatives from 18 African countries were invited.[28] The aim of the conference was to communicate and exchange agricultural development experiences to help poverty reduction in Africa. China’s achievements in poverty alleviation in a relatively short period of time provide an inspiring example and has aroused much interest in Africa, where  poverty still prevail. According to the Chinese experience, developing agricultural productivity could make a critical contribution in reducing poverty. Under the framework of FOCAC, China has committed to constructing a series of Agricultural Demonstration Centres in Africa, and sending Chinese agricultural experts and technicians to help train African agricultural professionals. The CPC’s efforts in this regard represent another type of cooperation.

Third, the CPC has offered training programmes to middle-level and senior members of African ruling parties, to help cultivate the party cadres of African countries. So far, the CPC has held training programmes for six African political parties (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: CPC’s training programmes to African political parties

Name of African Parties

Participants

Total number and dates of the  training workshops

African National Congress, South Africa

National executive members

5 (November 2009, July 2010, November 2010, October 2011, July 2013)

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

Senior party cadres

2 (June 2011, November 2011)

National Congress Party, Sudan

Senior party cadres

3 (June 2012, the second time unknown, June 2014)

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, South Sudan

Senior party cadres

2(November 2012,November 2014)

South West African People’s Organization, Namibia

Central committee members

2 (February 2013, February 2014)

The Communist Party of South Africa

Senior party cadres

1 (September 2013)

Source: the official website of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC

Like the training workshops organised by other Chinese ministries, those arranged by the CPC also offered academic presentations and lectures, field studies, and extensive interaction with Chinese officials and entrepreneurs. Besides, the training workshops offered by the CPC attach importance to party capacity building.  Capacity building in this instance includes strengthening the  organisational capability of African ruling parties, and disciplining their members.

Fourth, the CPC has provided training workshops for the youth leaders of African ruling parties. To date, youth leaders from Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa and Portuguese-speaking African countries have attended the training classes (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6:CPC training workshops for African political party youth leaders

Category of training workshop

Date

Participating Countries

Workshop for English-speaking countries

June 2010

Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Zambia

April 2014

South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc.

Workshop for French-speaking countries

June 2012

Congo, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Democratic Congo, Gabon, Guinea

June 2012

Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Chad

Workshop for Portuguese-Speaking Countries

March 2014

Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau

Source: the official website of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC and other online materials.

In addition, the CPC and the South West African People’s Organization of Namibia have twice jointly organised a China-Africa Youth Leaders Forum, the first of which was held in May 2011 in Windhoek Namibia, the second in June 2012 in Beijing. This forum serves the same goals of strengthening mutual understanding and confidence between Chinese and African Party youth leaders.

To sum up, it could be strongly argued that China and Africa have explored ways to share and exchange experiences in a wide range of areas, such as agriculture, reform and opening-up, infrastructure construction, health care, poverty reduction, education, SMEs, and capacity building of the ruling party. The process involves multiple actors and stakeholders, takes various forms, and remains to be further expanded in the future. However, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Sino-African governance exchange. At the same time, it should also be recognised that, compared to all-around scale of Sino-African economic cooperation, the exchanges on governing experiences between China and Africa are less remarkable, and have lagged behind the demands of economic cooperation.[29] Therefore, the China-Africa governance exchanges are expected to become more frequent and important.[30]

The Dynamics between Governance Experience Exchanges and China’s Non-Intervention Policy

Will increasing exchanges lead China to meddling in the internal affairs of African Countries, which is a deviation from its traditional policy of non-interference? This question is critical to this discussion. With the augmentation of China’s economic interests and the presence of its citizens in Africa, and given the volatile situation in some African countries, there has been heated debate between Chinese academics and diplomats around China’s adherence to its traditional non-intervention policy. There is considerable literature on this subject and it is increasing. The prevailing argument is that China should adhere to its original doctrine, for abandoning it will present future difficulties.[31]

However, in reconciling the protection of Chinese overseas interests and the insistence on non-interference tradition, some arguments hold that non-intervention does not equalise non-action (doing nothing). This means that China should have a good balance between non-intervention and constructive engagement or creative involvement; should stick to the principles but also be flexible; and should take consideration of the African Union’s Principle of Non-Indifference and the Western Countries’ Conception of the Responsibility to Protect.[32]

Some scholars emphasise the mutual and reciprocal nature of non-interference, which is what China advocates as the principle of Mutual Non-Interference in internal affairs, which originates from The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence.  Therefore, it would be wrong to argue that China’s policy is only its own unilateral adherence to the non-intervention policy.[33]There are individual media opinions that argue that China’s non-intervention policy has been caught in a dilemma, and the way out of it is to emulate America’s policy to hold the sword to protect its economic interests.[34] In short, almost all the Chinese diplomats and academicians still uphold the non-intervention policy, which albeit not perfect, brings more advantages and flexibility to China’s foreign policy. In some scholar’s eyes, the Chinese Non-Intervention Policy constitutes the main source of its attractiveness and soft power in Africa.[35]

China’s non-interference policy has a deep foundation in its traditions and culture. Chinese traditional culture is a combination of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism - all of which advocate peace, love and harmony.[36] Confucianism opposes hegemony, stands for kind-heartedness and non-offence, recognises the diversity of things, and regards with disdain the imposition of one’s will on others. Some of its admonitions are well-known and deep-rooted in the hearts and minds of Chinese populace, such as that of ‘not doing unto others what you don’t want done to yourself’, and ‘the Gentlemen always seeking harmony but not uniformity’.[37] Taoism respects the natural law of things, insists on ‘governing by doing nothing which goes against the nature’, and holds that the less interference the better.[38]Buddhism preaches peace and spiritual cultivation and growth. At the core of Chinese tradition there exists the cultural meme of preference for non-interference in another’s internal affairs. One frequently cited historical example is that of Zheng He, the famed eunuch admiral of China’s Ming dynasty (1368--1644). He led powerful navy fleets and paid seven visits to the ports of Indian Ocean islands and East African countries between 1405 and 1430, but never attempted to colonise the places his fleets visited.

Evidence of this can be found in China’s practice of non-interference in Africa in modern times. When a new government comes to power, the Chinese government usually recognises it and considers this recognition as respecting the sovereign choice of African people. The regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya since 2011 and China’s reactions to these reflect most recent evidence of non-intervention. Whichever political forces in these countries win the election and form the government, the Chinese government is willing to immediately establish official relations with them and offer whatever kind of assistance necessary, never pointing fingers in blame of any political forces in these countries.

In September and December 2014, Mouvement Ennahdha, then ruling party of Tunisia, and Egyptian President, Abdelfattah al Sisi, paid respective visits to Beijing, signalling a smooth transition for China to build friendly relations with the new regimes of these two countries. In other African countries, such as Mali, Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, and Niger, when a new ruling party or governing coalition took office, the CPC or Chinese government, through sending or inviting delegations to pay official visits, managed to establish a new party-to-party or government-to-government relations to ensure a successful transition to, or continuation of, friendly cooperation.[39]

Even when China sustains economic losses due to political changes in African countries, the non-interference policy assists it swiftly adapting to the new reality, and avoids passive situation for china. For example, the secession of South Sudan from Sudan posed a serious challenge to Chinese economic interests both in Sudan and South Sudan. Confronted with the inevitability of South Sudan’s independence, China stuck to its traditional non-intervention position but also proactively took steps to maintain good relations with both Sudan and South Sudan. In July 2007, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) sent its first delegation to China, and established formal contact with the CPC. In October 2010, the International Department of CPC Central Committee dispatched a delegation to visit both Sudan’s National Congress Party and SPLM, to coordinate South-North relations of Sudan, and to pave the way for further cooperation with Sudan and the soon-to-be-independent South Sudan.

After its independence in July 2011, South Sudan consolidated its engagement with China, and expressed its desire to learn about China’s development and governance experiences. China has also been willing to share its experiences with SPLM. In October 2011, only three months after independence, the SPLM sent its first delegation to China. From the outset, the Chinese government declared that it respected South Sudan’s right to independently choose its political system and development path. In November 2012, the CPC began to hold training workshops for senior cadres of the SPLM. In April 2013, the CPC sent a delegation to South Sudan, which held three special lectures for cadres of SPLM and officials of South Sudan’s government. These dealt with the themes of ruling party building, China’s economic and social development process, and China’s agriculture and poverty reduction programmes. They were warmly welcomed by the participants from South Sudan.[40]In the same month, the SPLM sent a delegation to China, which manifested the close interaction between the two sides. Since the political crisis of 15 December 2013 broke out in South Sudan, China has been actively promoting peace talks between SPLM and SPLM-In-Opposition, keeping contact with both sides, and encouraging them to resolve their disputes and differences using political means.

The Chinese Special Representative for African affairs has frequently conducted shuttle diplomacy to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the crisis. In July 2014, James Wani Igga, the Vice President of South Sudan and the Vice Chairman of the SPLM, paid a visit to China, which recommitted itself to respecting South Sudan’s right to independently select its development road in accordance with South Sudan’s national situation. China has also committed to sending peacekeepers to join the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which is working to end the violence and war in the region and create a viable environment for political settlement of the crisis.

All these activities by China should not be interpreted as deviation from its non-intervention approach by interfering in the domestic affairs of South Sudan. China has legitimate energy interests in South Sudan, and has a responsibility to protect these interests. Its involvement with the peace process in South Sudan is based on four factors, i.e. defending China’s investment and economic interests, the consent of the stakeholders (warring parties and others), the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the fulfilment of the international responsibility of an emerging power. Interference usually disregards the will of a sovereign country, prefers to act unilaterally and imposes punishing measures (such as sanctions or military attack), to impose the meddler’s will-- all of which are against China’s non-intervention policy and its practice.

A Chinese Model of Governance?

Since reform and opening-up, China has accumulated some efficient and successful governing experiences in the development area, which, while probably being relevant for the development and governance of African countries, could not constitute a typical governance model for them to emulate. Because huge differences exist between China and African countries in their history, political and cultural traditions, and national conditions, China’s governance model can not simply be transplanted and replicated in Africa. However, African leaderships might utilise some of China’s critical governance experiences when they explore their own governing methods.

First, strong leadership is usually the precondition of efficient and good governance.[41] The ruling party should be the core and cream of society, with enough strength, wisdom and capacity to design and implement national development programmes, to select and cultivate well-qualified cadres, to improve and better the livelihood of its constituency, and to deal well with the issue of power succession. Strong leadership also guarantees political and social stability, which, always regarded by Chinese leadership as the most important thing in governance, contributes to the formulation and implementation of consistent governmental policy.

Second, African countries should attach great importance to the development of agriculture and infrastructure construction to facilitate poverty reduction and launch the economy. The CPC Central Committee has a leading group office for rural work, which makes all the agriculture-related policies, and coordinates different governmental ministries when implementing the policies. For many years, the Number One Document issued by the CPC Central Committee has focused on farmers, agriculture and rural areas.[42]The CPC has established a full set of administrative management systems for agriculture, which stretches from the centre to grassroots government (township), facilitating policy implementation, agricultural technology extension and diffusion to villages and farmers.[43] China’s poverty reduction programme is largely led by agriculture, which underlines the importance of focusing on effective agricultural growth as a means of poverty alleviation in countries where most people live in rural areas, as is the case in many African countries.[44] Furthermore, the growing agricultural sector provides raw materials, capital and markets for manufacturing and other sectors that stimulate broader economic development and growth in  employment in non-farming activities; this, in turn, helps absorb surplus labour from agriculture.[45] Apart from agriculture, the Chinese government gave much attention to building infrastructure, which saw the rapid development and expansion of roads, railways, ports, airports, bridges, power plants, telecommunications and the IT sector across China, preparing a solid foundation for the launch of the Chinese economy.

Third, the relationship between receiving foreign aid and maintaining self-reliance and independence should be well balanced. China used to be an aid-recipient country, yet it consistently adheres to the principle of ‘self-reliance first, foreign aid second’, which guarantees that it holds the ownership of development and prevents the formation of a mentality of dependence on aid.[46] China might compromise on some issues, but would never give up its sovereignty for aid or allow the aid provider to interfere with its internal affairs; it usually puts foreign money in the most needed places so as to make the best use of it; and always tries to keep foreign aid, especially aid in the form of debt, at a controllable level.[47]

In China, there is some academic discussion on China Mode, but few advocate simple duplication in Africa.[48] The mainstream arguments of Chinese academicians are that African countries could learn from Chinese development experiences, but should not blindly follow or copy them. As far as the Chinese politicians are concerned, they seem reluctant to use or accept the term China Mode, one reason for which might be that China has had some negative experiences in copying others’ models.[49] This chapter reconfirms the viewpoint that there is no Chinese governance model that could be indiscriminately applied in the African contexts. Neither could we find any African country that is duplicating the Chinese governance model today. In effect, many development and governance experiences are not typically Chinese. They are global. For instance, almost all developed countries have a strong agriculture sector, enjoy domestic peace and stability, cherish self-reliance, and detest foreign meddling in their domestic affairs. To end poverty, African countries need to promote high crop yield, ensure internal peace and safety, develop infrastructure, and have a capable government.

Conclusion and Recommendations

China-Africa governance experience exchanges will deepen the mutual understanding of the respective political systems, development lessons, and different national situations. The FOCAC Beijing Summit of 2006 has committed both sides to strengthening this aspect of cooperation, which shows how serious China and Africa are to further boost the exchanges on governance and development experiences, and has the potential of profoundly influencing developmental prospects. Needless to say, the Looking East policy and trend will probably be reinforced by African countries. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Africa has already turned to China for more economic opportunities to expand trade, investment, infrastructure building and economic cooperation. The governance exchanges, supported by the Chinese non-intervention policy and huge foreign currency reserves, will add to China’s attractiveness for Africa, which, in turn, will accelerate its pace of establishing closer political and economic relations with China.

Moreover, China-Africa governance engagement will be conducive to protecting and enhancing Chinese economic and business interests in Africa. Closer government-to-government relationships will no doubt benefit and safeguard China’s economic activities on the continent. Of course this should be based on a mutually beneficial arrangement. Currently, there exists a potential of a paradigm shift to fundamentally change the political and economic order in Africa, which has been dominated by the West for a long time. It should be clearly pointed out that the decline of the Western influence in Africa is not because of Chinese engagement in Africa, but because of the long-term misleading and ineffective approaches made by the West. China’s engagement (governance exchanges included) in Africa, in essence, have not compromised Western efforts to promote good governance and other agendas in Africa. It is the West’s own mistakes that are responsible for its decreasing influence on the continent. As one argument states: Western intervention in other governments, whether during colonisation or decolonisation, has been far on the side of unhelpful.[50] China’s economic rise and its consistent attachment of importance to Africa made her a natural alternative for African countries. However, China should bear in mind the mistakes made in Africa by the West, and it would be unwise and dangerous for China to repeat the same wrongdoings there.

It should be noted that China-Africa exchanges on governance and development experiences are still in the early stages, and carry the element of Chinese assistance to Africa. With both sides engaging in good faith, seriousness and persistence, the governance exchanges will no doubt boost China-Africa win-win cooperation and produce other results. In order to further promote China-Africa exchange on governance experiences and enhance its effectiveness under the framework of FOCAC, both China and African countries should double their efforts to make FOCAC more attractive and sustainable.  This chapter offers the following recommendations:

China should theorise its practice of exchange of governance experiences with African countries: For a long time, Western countries have dominated the international discourse rights to preach the advantages and universalities of Western political and governance standards. They try to shape and reshape the political process in African countries and impose their will to force African countries to construct a governance system based on the Western moulds. China does not need to follow in Western steps to impose its model on Africa. However, it could do more to theorise its governance experiences and introduce them to African countries for reference. The Chinese school of governance theory will no doubt diversify the governance theories in the world, and offer African countries one more alternative to learn from. China has realised the advantages of its governance system, but the theorisation work of its governance experiences should be strengthened and accelerated.

African countries should improve the capacity to match China’s initiatives and make best use of China’s governance assistance in different sectors: Many African governments are weak and vulnerable to outside interference. The capacity deficits of African countries are multi-dimensional, hence, it is imperative for African countries to strengthen capacity building, and add their inputs to the decision-making process of FOCAC.

The fight against corruption should be incorporated in the FOCAC framework when it comes to the exchange of governance experiences: Corruption is a chronic illness, both in China and Africa, and causes huge loss to national interests. FOCAC should concentrate more on sharing experiences of combating corruption, and put effective anti-corruption experience into practice.

Finally, from a historical perspective, China has not had a saviour mentality in terms of its international relations. It will not suddenly develop such a mindset when engaging with Africa. It could be expected that China will not fundamentally transform its non-interference policy in Africa, except that China’s legitimate interests suffer great challenges and huge loss of Chinese citizens and property. Even in that scenario, African countries could be the reliable partners of China to deal with the common challenge. In the end, it is up to the African statesmen, entrepreneurs and intellectuals to jointly find and design indigenous governance models suitable for different African contexts. In the process, China might contribute its part to the development of Africa.

 

 

SourceGarth Shelton, Funeka Yazini April, Li Anshan ed. FOCAC 2015 A New Beginning of China-Africa Relations, Published by the Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, pp.80-106

  



[1] Zeng Aiping is an assistant research fellow from Department for Developing Countries Studies, China Institute of International Studies.

[2] Li, A., 2011. FOCAC Role and Function in China-Africa Cooperation and Sustainable Development, Research report of Centre for African Studies, Peking University. Available at http://awsassets.panda.org. [Accessed 2 March 2014].

[3] Li, A.,2012. FOCAC Twelve Years Later, Achievements, Challenges, and the Way Forward.The Nordic Africa Institute, Discussion Paper 74.Available at http://www.safpi.org. [Accessed 2 March 2014].

[4] Li, A.,2012. On the Origin of FOCAC and China’s Strategy towards Africa, Foreign Affairs Review, 3, p.20.

[5] MOFCOM, 2002. A Brief Introduction of China’s Training Class for African Economic Management Officials.[Online] 6 July 2002. Available at http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn l[Accessed 2 March 2014].

[6] Qian, C., and Qiao, J.,2002. The Opening Ceremony Held for the Training Class for African Ministerial Level Economic Management Officials. [Online] 2 September 2002. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com. [Accessed 2 March 2014].

[7] Li, A.,2012. On the Origin of FOCAC and China’s Strategy towards Africa, Foreign Affairs Review, 3, p.20.

[8] Li, A., and Liu, H., 2012.On the Operation Mechanism of FOCAC and Its Relation with African Integration, Teaching and Research, 6, p.60.

[9] Li. A.,2006. On the Adjustment and Transformation of China’s African Policy, West Asia and Africa, 8, p.l6.

[10] FOCAC Beijing Summit. Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, [online] 5 November 2006. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn.  [Accessed 2 June 2014].

[11] FOCAC Beijing Summit, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009). [Online] 16 November 2006. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn [Accessed 2 June 2014].

[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014. An Overview of FOCAC. [Online] August 2014. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn. [Accessed 30 August 2014].

[13] The 1stMinisterial Conference of FOCAC.Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development. [Online] 25 September 2006. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn[Accessed 2 June 2014].

[14] Zhang, X., Xue, Y., Qiang, Y.and Luo, J., 2004. Educational Exchanges and Cooperation between China and African Countries, West Asia and Africa, 3, p.25.

[15] National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 2013. The Ministerial Seminar on Population and Development for African Countries Opens. [Online] 24 October 2013. Available at http://www.chinapop.gov.cn [Accessed 15 June2014].; The Information Platform of Population and Development in South-South Cooperation,2012. The Seminar on the Promotion of Maternal and Child Health for French-Speaking African Countries opens. [Online] 22 October 2012. Available at http://www.sscpop.cn [Accessed 15 June 2014].

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ministry of Commerce. 2000. FOCAC Holds Conference on China-Africa Communication of the Main Experiences of Reform. [Online] 11 October 2000.Available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn. [Accessed 15 June 2014].

[18] Zeng, P.,2000. Conference on China-Africa Communication of the Main Experiences of Reform. Keynote Speech. [Online] 11 October 2000. Available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn[Accessed 15 June 2014].

[19] Ibid.

[20] Li, A.,2006. On the Adjustment and Transformation of China’s African Policy, West Asia and Africa, 8, p.l6.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Financial Information. 2008. China and Africa Hold Seminar on Rural Finance Development, Economic and Trade Update,5,p.91.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Li, A.,2006. On the Adjustment and Transformation of China’s African Policy, West Asia and Africa, 8, p.l3.

[25] Zhong,W., 2012. Inter-Party Relations Promote Sino-African Strategic Partnership. [Online] 28 August 2012. Available at http://www.china.org.cn.  [Accessed 1 August 2014].

[26] The cases for the CPC visiting other African countries are as follows: there are nine countries receiving three CPC delegations, includingGuinea Ecuatorial (Partido Democratico), Sierra Leone(All People’s Congress, The People’s Party), Lesotho(Lesotho Congress for Democracy), Cameroon(Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais), Libya(the Genral People’s Congress), Malawi (Democratic Progressive Party), Djibouti (Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès),Congo (Parti du Travail), Niger(Alliance Nigérienne Pour la Démocratie et le Progrès-Zamanlahiya, Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement-Nassara, Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme-Tarayya); eight countries hosting two CPC delegations, i.e. Madagascar (Tiako I Madagasikara), Nigeria (People’s Democratic Party), Burundi (Comité National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie),Liberia (Unity Party), Eritrea (People’s Front for Democracy & Justice), Ghana (National Democratic Congress),the Central African Republic (Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain, Parti KWA NA KWA), Mauritania (Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social, Pacte National pour la Démocratie et le Développement); six countries receiving one CPC delegation, i.e. Côte d’Ivoire (Front Populaire Ivoirien), Guniea (Parti du L’Unité et du Progrès),Togothe Rally of the Togolese People,Benin (the hosting party is unknown), Guinea-Bissau (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) and Chad (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut).

[27] For those African countries sending party delegations to China less than four times during the time-frame, see the following statistics. Eight countries each sending three party delegations to China include Sierra Leone (All People’s Congress, The People’s Party),Ghana (National Democratic Congress),Congo(Parti du Travail), Eritrea (People’s Front for Democracy & Justice), Algeria (Front de Libération Nationale, Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix),Madagascar (Action pour la Renaissance de Madagascar, Tiako I Madagasikara), Mauritius (Labour Party, Militant Socialist Movement), Malawi (Democratic Progressive Party, People’s Party). Those dispatching two delegations to visit the CPC are the followingten countries: Cameroon (Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais), Botswana (Democratic Party), Chad (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut), Benin(unknown), Liberia (Unity Party),Libya (General People’s Congress),Guniea (Parti du L’Unité et du Progrès, Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée-Arc-en-Ciel), Côte d’Ivoire (Parti Démocratique, Front Populaire),Egypt (National Democratic Party, folk diplomatic representative delegation), the Central African Republic (Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain, Parti KWA NA KWA). Only Guinea Bissau and Seychelles each send one party delegation (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde and People’s Progressive Front, respectively) to China.

[28] International Department of Central Committee of CPC, 2010. China-Africa Agricultural Forum Opens. [Online] 11 August 2010.Available at http://www.idcpc.org.cn/duiwai/niandugaikuang/2010/100811-1.htm [Accessed 2 June 2014].

[29] He, W., 2012.China and Africa Should Strengthen Exchanges on Development Experience and Governance, International Business News,[Online] 19 July2012.Available at http://www.shangbao.net.cn. [Accessed 15 June 2014].

[30] Daniel L. 2013. China-South Sudan:Governance in Emerging Relations. [Online] November 2013.South African Institute of International Affairs. Global Powers and African Programme, Policy Briefing 77. Available at http://www.saiia.org.za [Accessed 2 February 2014].

[31] HereI only cite some representative articles written by Chinese scholars and diplomats: Zhan, S., 2004.Non-interference in Other Nation’s Internal Affairs and Social System is the Most Important Principle of the New Order of International Relations, International Studies,5,pp.5-10.; Zhang,Z.,2010. On the Non-interference Principle of China’s Diplomacy in Africa. West Asia and Africa,1,pp.11-16.;Zheng, X..2011. Non-interference Principle not out of Date, Oriental Morning Post, 29 March, p.A18.; Li, B.,2014. On the Evolution of China’s Non-interference Principle, Seeker, 2, pp.50-53.

[32] Li,B.,2007. On the Responsibility to Protect and Its Implications on Non-interference Principle, Science of Law,3,pp.131-139.; Wu,S.,2011. Non-interference Principle is not Non-action, People’s Daily, 31 May, p.3.; Zhao, H.,2011. Non-interference in Internal Affair and Constructive Intervention - Reflection on Chinese Policy after the Unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Journal of Xinjiang Normal University(Social Sciences), 32(1), pp.23-29.; Pan, Y.,2012. China’s Non-Interference Diplomacy: From Defensive Advocacy to Participatory Advocacy, World Economics and Politics,9,pp.45-57.; Wang, Y.,2013. Creative Involvement: A Suggested Doctrine for China Based on the Reality of Sino-African Relations, Journal of International Security Studies,1,pp.4-18.; Zhen, N.and Chen, Z.,2014. The Principle of Non-intervention and China’s Voting Practice in the United Nations Security Council since the End of Cold War, International Studies,3, pp.21-36.

[33] Wu, S., 2009. Mao Tse-tung’s Thinking on Mutual Non-interference and China’s Independent and Peaceful Foreign Policy, Heilongjiang Local Chronicles, 211(18),pp.6-7.

[34] Xie, Y.,2010. The Dilemma for Non-interference Principle, Southern Window (Biweekly),1,pp.42-44.

[35] Max R. 2011. Non-interference and Pragmatic Cooperation: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power in Africa, Doctoral thesis, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.

[36] Zhang, Z.,2010. On the Non-interference Principle of China’s Diplomacy in Africa. West Asia and Africa,1,p.12.

[37] Ibid,, p.12.

[38] Ibid,, pp.11-12.

[39] The new ruling party or governing coalition in Mali, Kenya, Senegal, Zambia and Niger is Le Rassemblement pour le Mali, Jubilee Coalition Alliance, Alliance Pour la République, the Patriotic Front, Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme-Tarayya, respectively.

[40] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in South Sudan,2013. The Delegation from the International Department of Central Committee of CPC Visits South Sudan.[Online] 8 April 2013. Available at http://ss.chineseembassy.org/chn/sbwl/t1029061.htm, [Accessed 2 February 2014].

[41] Li, A., 2009. Chinese Experiences in Development: Implications for Africa.[Online]18 June 2009, Issue 438, Pambazuka News. Available at http://pambazuka.org. [Accessed 2 February 2014].; Li. Z., 2007. How African States can Learn from China’s Experience of Development, West Asia and Africa,4, p.51.

[42] Li, X.,2014. International seminar on Agricultural International Cooperation in Africa: Opportunities & Challenges for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. What Can Africa Learn from China’s Experience in Agricultural Development? Discussion Paper. October 13-14, 2014, Beijing, China.

[43] Li, X. Guo,Z.,and W,J. 2011. China’s Success in Agricultural Development and its Implications for Africa, West Asia and Africa,8,p.84.

[44] Li, X.,2013.“What can Africa learn from China’s agricultural miracle?” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Development Co-operation Report 2013: Ending Poverty.  Available onhttp://www.oecd.org.  [Accessed 2 March 2014].

[45] Ibid.

[46] Li, A., 2009. Chinese Experiences in Development: Implications for Africa.[Online]18 June 2009, Issue 438, Pambazuka News. Available at http://pambazuka.org. [Accessed 2 February 2014].

[47] Ibid.

[48] Tao,W.,2009. China Mode and its Implications for Africa, International Studies,1, pp.37-41.

[49] Li, A., 2009. Chinese Experiences in Development: Implications for Africa.

[50] William E., 2007. The White Man’s Burden, Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin Books.

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