North Korean Nuclear Issue in China-U.S. Relations

China International Studies, May/June, 2015, pp.5`-67 | 作者: Yang Xiyu | 时间: 2015-07-10 | 责编: 王嘉珮
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Yang Xiyu

 

Since the North Korean nuclear issue emerged in the early 1990s, it has been of growing importance to China-U.S. relations. On the one hand, China and the United States basically take the same position on the issue: They both call for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and oppose the development of nuclear weapons by the two Koreas; and they advocate peaceful settlement of the issue through the Six-Party Talks, because it will determine the prospects for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the peace and security of Northeast Asia.[1] However, on the other hand, as major global powers, China and the United States play different roles in the security pattern of the peninsula, which means they have different relations with the two Koreas as well as disagreement on how to peacefully settle the nuclear issue.

 

How to consolidate the common ground and shared interests on the issue between China and the United States, how to promote their cooperation in the denuclearization of the peninsula and how to reduce mutual suspicions and disagreement on issues that are major concerns for both will not only contribute to a nuclear-free peninsula with lasting peace and stability, but also have a profound impact on the new model of major-country relations between China and the United States.

 

Basic Policies of China and the United States on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

 

Due to the Korean War and the lasting influence of the Cold War, China and the United States have entirely different bilateral relations with North Korea, but they share similar positions on the denuclearization of the peninsula and similar concerns.

 

Throughout the Cold War, China and the United States provided large quantities of military aid to their respective allies, namely South Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea (ROK), in the case of the United States and North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in the case of China, but neither offered aid that could generate nuclear or missile proliferation. After South Korea’s secret development of nuclear weapons was revealed in the 1970s, the U.S. government carried out direct interventions to force South Korea to give up the plan.[2]

 

After the Cold War, two strategic and historic events significantly altered the security pattern of mutual deterrence between North and South Korea: The first referred to the radical change of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe so that North Korea lost a vital foreign economic aid provider and a strong military supporter; second, China accommodated the trend of the times characterized by the end of the Cold War and a thaw in the relations between the two Koreas;[3] thus it normalized its relations with South Korea, leading to a structural change in the “balance of power” between the China-DPRK alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Therefore, the Cold War between China and South Korea came to an end while the Cold War between the two Koreas continued.

 

The two aforementioned events marked the end of indirect trilateral military collaboration among North Korea, China and the Soviet Union, while trilateral ties among South Korea, the United States and Japan were strengthened. This change fueled the strategic determination of North Koreato accelerate its nuclear weapons program. The nuclear issue became the security focus of the peninsula as well as a new area where exchange, cooperation and conflicts between China and the United States took place.

 

China has a consistent and clear position on North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. Whether during or after the Cold War, it has always called for a peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and opposed any import, deployment or storage of nuclear weapons from abroad by North Korea, as well as the development of nuclear weapons by either Korea. Therefore, although China has been providing extensive and large-scale aid to North Korea since the 1950s, it has never offered aid that might facilitate North Korea’s nuclear weapon development or delivery.

 

Since the nuclear issue escalated in 1994, China has always made it clear in its bilateral exchange with North Korea that it would firmly oppose North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. China denounced North Korea’s three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 and it supported and abided by related resolutions and sanctions imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council. In September 2013, the relevant government departments in China issued an administrative instruction prohibiting any Chinese enterprises from exporting to North Korea more than 900 civilian-military dual-use or sensitive products, a long list of over 300 pages.[4]

 

Besides, in China’s view, the North Korean nuclear issue is not a simple matter of nuclear proliferation, but a strategic and comprehensive issue concerning the national security of North Korea. Given that, in the efforts to promote a North Korea free of nuclear weapons, consideration should also be given to North Korea’s security, political, economic and diplomatic concerns.

 

With this in mind, when the North Korean nuclear crisis broke out for a second time in early 2003, leading to acute tension between North Korea and the United States, China made concerted diplomatic efforts to initiate the Six-Party Talks among North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan in August 2003. The talks were held under the theme of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. China also emphasized that the six parties must ensure the denuclearization of the peninsula rather than just North Korea. The Six-Party Talks aim to promote a nuclear-weapons-free North Korea, and establish an institutional arrangement to ensure neither side of the peninsula tests, produces, accepts, possesses, stores, deploys or uses nuclear weapons. Denuclearization refers to the military denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; both the Koreas still have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the same as other sovereign states.[5] Thanks to the advocacy and mediation by the Chinese delegation, members of the Six-Party Talks emphasized North Korea’s right of peaceful use of nuclear energy in their September 19 Joint Statement.

 

As for the denuclearization of North Korea, China has maintained a consistent position, namely promoting the Six-Party Talks by focusing on the nuclear issue itself while removing the external impediment, which is the hostile external environment faced by North Korea. Through the talks, China hopes that a package of comprehensive solutions can be agreed upon by the six parties based on the principles and objectives defined by the September 19 Joint Statement, and progress can be made in the normalization of the relations between North Korea and other countries by replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 with a permanent peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula. China also hopes that a cooperation mechanism for Northeast Asia can be established in which North Korea is treated as an equal member.

 

Unlike China, whose position has remained consistent, the United States has made complicated adjustments in its fundamental policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue. On the one hand, the Washington upholds the basic policy of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula; on the other hand, throughout the 20 years of the Clinton administration, the Bush administration and the Obama administration, the United States has adopted three totally different attitudes and policies toward the issue, creating huge uncertainty and wavering.

 

1. The Clinton Administration: From Tough Attitude to Pragmatic Engagement

 

In the early days after Bill Clinton took office, the United States adopted a tough policy toward North Korea: The Pentagon was ready to launch military action by carrying out “a surgical strike” against Yongbyon, where North Korea’s nuclear facilities are located, in order to destroy its nuclear program. However, the plan was strongly opposed by its ally South Korea. Meanwhile, China expressed deep concerns and opposition to any military action by the United States and called for a peaceful settlement.

 

In the face of the opposition to military action from North Korea’s neighbors and the possible consequences of a “surgical strike,” former U.S. President Jimmy Carter paid a surprise non-governmental visit to North Korea before the U.S. government brought its strike into action. He had candid talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, which helped resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.[6] The United States and North Korea reached the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework in 1994 after serious negotiations.[7]

 

The Agreed Framework not only covers the North Korean nuclear issue, but also a wide range of economic and political agreements such as a “nuclear freeze and denuclearization in exchange for compensation” and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. After the signing of the agreement, the United States and North Korea apologized to each other. The U.S. military held extensive negotiations with North Korea on 21 issues, including the remains of personnel killed in the Korean War and North Korea’s suspension of missile tests. They reached agreement on 15 issues and progress was made in two areas.[8] The most important achievement was the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué signed in October 2000 where both the United States and North Korea solemnly promised that they would make concerted efforts to build a new model of bilateral relations for the 21st century so as to safeguard peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. This new model was based on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.[9]

 

It is obvious that the 2000 Joint Communiqué injected new hope into improving U.S.-DPRK relations in the post-Cold War era. Jo Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, and Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, paid high-level visits to each other’s countries. Moreover, a visit to North Korea by the U.S. president was put on the agenda.

 

2. The Bush Administration: From Total Negation of His Predecessor’s Policies to Easing Tensions

 

After George W. Bush took office in 2001, the Republican Party altered U.S. policies toward North Korea, especially on the nuclear issue. In an environment where neo-conservatism prevailed in Washington’s policymaking circle, the Bush administration reviewed the U.S. policy on North Korea’s nuclear issue with its characteristic “anything but Clinton’s” mindset, which meant the policies on North Korea adopted by the Clinton administration were not to be further implemented. Bush’s noticeable turnaround triggered another nuclear crisis after James A. Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited North Korea in October 2002 and his secret talks on uranium enrichment with Kang Sok-Ju, First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea, collapsed.[10]

 

The Bush administration’s policy on North Korea had two cha-racteristics: First, it changed the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and demanded North Korea’s nuclear disarmament unilaterally, namely “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” in exchange for the United States’ “multilateral written security guarantee” so that the United States did not have to take corresponding measures as required under the framework;[11] second, North Korea had to destroy all its nuclear weapons and related plans, and give up the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy, which meant that North Korea was not allowed to develop nuclear power stations. During negotiations on a joint statement in the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the U.S. delegation delivered an instruction from Washington, saying that it was firmly against any North Korean nuclear development plans including the right to develop nuclear power.

 

As progress was made in the Six-Party Talks initiated by China, especially after the signing of the September 19 Joint Statement, which prompted North Korea to start the process of nuclear disarmament, it became clear to the United States that its policy of exerting pressure on North Korea had barely worked over the previous years. In response, the Bush administration made an adjustment of its policies toward North Korea. During his second term, Bush changed his previous policy of refusing to have contact with North Korea, and conducted limited contact and bilateral talks on the nuclear issue and the partial lifting of U.S. sanctions against North Korea, which resulted in two positive outcomes: (i) Thanks to China’s mediation, the United States and North Korea set up a dialogue mechanism in which the latter agreed to take “disablement” measures to finally disarm its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon;[12] and (ii) the U.S. government stopped applying the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea and removed it from its list of “state sponsors of terrorism”; therefore, U.S. sanctions related to these two areas were lifted.

 

3. The Obama Administration: Another Policy Gridlock

 

When Barack Obama became U.S. president, he was faced with the international financial crisis and disorder in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Also after the “disablement” of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, although the North Korean nuclear issue became less pressing, it was difficult to continue the process of denuclearization. As a result, the issue was given less priority in the U.S. foreign strategy. In order to focus on the settlement of more important crises, the U.S. government delayed resuming contact with North Korea: Even when North Korea conducted another nuclear test in May 2009 regardless of strong opposition from the international community, the Obama administration continued its so-called “strategic patience” policy and refused to resume bilateral dialogue with North Korea. This meant the U.S.-DPRK dialogue mechanism established during the second term of the Bush administration ran aground.

 

Shortly after Kim Jong-un became leader of North Korea, the U.S. government signed a negotiated agreement with North Korea on February 29, 2012, namely the February 29 Agreement; however, it ended up a vaguely worded and opinions-divided document.[13] Not long after that, North Korea violated UN resolutions by conducting successive satellite test launches. In response, the United States announced that North Korea had torn up the February 29 Agreement, while North Korea claimed that such launches were not covered by the agreement. This dispute not only made it impossible to carry out the agreement, but also ruled out the possibility of continuing the newly resumed U.S.-DPRK dialogue.

 

As for North Korea, the top priority of its foreign strategy was to facilitate smooth communication with the United States, especially on major issues concerning the Korean Peninsula. The Obama administration’s “strategic patience” almost eliminated the possibility of resumption of dialogue between the two, which understandably resulted in a dissatisfied North Korea. In November 2010, it responded to a South Korean military exercise by shelling Yeonpyeong Island and claimed that “a war on the Korean Peninsula was about to break out” and “a global nuclear war is possible”. In February 2013, when Kim Jong-un met with his guest Dennis Rodman, a former U.S. basketball player, he asked Rodman to deliver a message to the U.S. government expressing his willingness to have talks with Obama. However, the United States made no response to that. Shortly after that, North Korea declared it was tearing up the 1953 Armistice Agreement and suggested that “whether a war breaks out or not is just a matter of time”. Moreover, North Korea announced to foreign embassies in Pyongyang, and foreigners as well as South Korean citizens in Seoul that they should evacuate South Korea’s capital as soon as possible.

 

In essence, instead of beginning a war, Pyongyang’s brink-of-war actions were aimed at gaining U.S. attention by imposing military pressure and creating a security crisis so that bilateral negotiations would be resumed.

 

In response to North Korea’s strategy, the Obama administration adopted two policies. The first was to strengthen its military pressure and sanctions against North Korea. In 2010, after the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan warship and Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the United States put forward the strategy of “extended deterrence” and “extended nuclear deterrence” to further enhance its military alliance with South Korea. Moreover, more targeted and offensive actions, including landing operations and assaults, were introduced into their joint military exercises, and furthermore, a carrier strike group and B-2 strategic bombers were mobilized in the drill. Besides, outside the framework of the UN Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea, the United States continued to increase its unilateral sanctions against North Korea. The second policy was to have no direct official talks with North Korea, however pressing the situation on the peninsula became. In August 2011, the U.S. government accepted the visit of Kim Kye-gwan, First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea in the name of an academic conference, during which Stephen Bosworth, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, held an informal meeting with him. But even so, the United States did not change its basic policy toward North Korea characterized by isolation, blockade, sanctions and conditional dialogue.[14]

 

In December 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment in the United States claimed that its website suffered attacks from hackers named Supporters of North Korea and Guardians of Peace. In response, President Obama issued an executive order to impose additional sanctions against three state-owned North Korean enterprises and related individuals. In an online televised interview on January 22, 2015, Obama openly declared that the North Korean regime was about to collapse.[15] His remarks not only fueled tensions between the two states, but also showed that the Obama administration would continue to strengthen the sanctions against North Korea in its remaining two years in power.[16] The Obama administration’s policy adjustments toward Cuba and its experience in conducting intense substantive dialogue with Iran will not be repeated with North Korea.

 

Cooperation and Disagreement on North Korean Nuclear Issue Between China and the United States

 

As for their policies toward the North Korean nuclear issue, both China and the United States have demanded the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and they share the same position and policy goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. Moreover, since the Six-Party Talks were initiated by China, both countries have stated that the talks are the only feasible approach to the settlement of the issue, so they have made close communication and coordination with each other under and beyond the framework. Given that both China and the United States play unique roles in the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of North Korea’s nuclear issue through dialogue, the issue has become a vital subject of their presidential meetings, the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as other diplomatic conferences and negotiations at all levels. Due to the impact of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the Cheonan incident, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and other crises, the issue has hit the gridlock. Against this backdrop, both heads of state, after meeting with each other in January 2011, made a joint statement reconfirming their further cooperation on the nuclear issue and reiterating their deep concerns over the uranium enrichment plan announced by North Korea. They called for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks through necessary measures, so as to address the issue and related ones.[17]

 

The coordination and cooperation between China and the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue prevent it from spinning out of control, avoid nuclear nonproliferation and the outbreak of conflicts, and promise a peaceful settlement of the complicated security issue through the Six-Party Talks. If we make a comparison between China’s policies on the nuclear issue with that adopted by the three U.S. presidents, it is not hard to see that the two nations have differences not only in the consistency and stability of their policies, but also in substantive content.

 

First, China has maintained consistency and stability on the issue throughout the past decade while the United States has adopted different policies since the Clinton administration. These changes in policy have not only hindered a smooth settlement of the issue, but also cooperation on it.

 

Second, China has always called for increasing mutual trust, narrowing disagreement with the United States through dialogue, and gradually creating conditions for a nuclear-free peninsula through political, security, economic and diplomatic approaches; in comparison, the United States is over-dependent on imposing pressure and sanctions on North Korea, seeking to force it to give up its nuclear program unconditionally. Since the nuclear issue broke out again in October 2002, both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration have refused official talks with North Korea. Each time when the United States senses that it lacks measures to impose pressure on North Korea, it asks China to join the “sanction club” by taking advantage of China’s resources. Their different intentions and thinking, characterized by China’s call for dialogue and the United States’ preference for imposing pressure, have led to growing mutual suspicion between the two countries.

 

Third, China’s advocacy of denuclearization of North Korea is part of its efforts to secure a peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and its recognition that North Korea has the same right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as other sovereign states. However, since the Bush administration, the United States has called on North Korea to abandon its entire nuclear program, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This disagreement has not yet been solved.

 

Nonetheless, the common interests and agreement between China and the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have fundamental and strategic significance. This common ground is the basis of their long-term cooperation on the issue as well as a vital field for cooperation in their joint efforts to establish a new model of China-U.S. relations.

 

China and the United States Should Enhance Cooperation and Narrow Differences

 

Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that the Korean Peninsula has been trapped in a “periodic” loop of a crisis every four years.

 

When the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in 1994, the United States and North Korea were on the brink of war. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework helped ease the crisis and improved their relations, but four years later in 1998, North Korea’s test launch of a long-range ballistic missile triggered a second crisis, leaving the two countries in confrontation again. Thanks to hard but substantial negotiations, their relationship was turned around, characterized by their first high-level exchange visits: In October 2000, Jo Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, visited Washington as a special envoy, during which the two sides signed the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué in order to establish a new model for the relationship between the two countries in the 21st century. After that, Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Pyongyang and attended political meetings with Kim Jong-il.[18] Given the transfer of power in the United States, the issue of North Korea’s uranium enrichment touched off a third crisis four years later at the end of 2002, but thanks to China’s active mediation and efforts, the parties concerned initiated the Six-Party Talks. In September 2005, they signed the historic September 19 Joint Statement, which not only resolved the crisis, but also put the nuclear issue back on the right track of multilateral dialogue and negotiations. However, these efforts failed to end the “crisis loop”. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test regardless of strong opposition from the international community, leading to the fourth crisis.

 

Although the Six-Party Talks mechanism brought the parties concerned back onboard to resolve the crisis and facilitate the launch of substantive “disablement”, worryingly, the “crisis loop” still exists and the cycle has been shortened to a more frequent level: Three years after the fourth crisis in 2006, another crisis broke out on the Korean Peninsula; merely one year later in 2010, the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling ignited military confrontation.

 

Three years after Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the headquarters of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) suddenly made an announcement, saying, “The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.” North Korean authorities also called on the staff in foreign embassies in Pyongyang and all civilians in Seoul to evacuate. This announcement intensified the tensions between North and South Korea to the brink of war.

 

Why cannot North Korea end the “loop of crisis” more than two decades since the end of the Cold War? Though the causes of crises differ, the “loop of crisis” has persisted for a profound reason, namely two continuing abnormal situations.

 

First, the Korean Peninsula is still at war. The Korean Armistice Agreement signed in July 1953 was only a ceasefire agreement, prescribing that the warring factions should sign a peace agreement through negotiations so as to end the state of war. However, the parties concerned failed to reach a consensus to replace Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty in the 1954 Geneva Conference or the Geneva Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999. Therefore, the north and south of the Korean Peninsula remain in a virtual state of war from a legal perspective, and clashes between them frequently have occurred at the “provisional Military Demarcation Line”, as well as in waters off the controversial Five West Sea Islands. Moreover, as the military ally of the ROK, the United States stations large military forces there, indicating that the United States and North Korea are still at war. This is the fundamental reason why the Korean Peninsula can hardly sustain long-term peace. Given that, the September 19 Joint Statement, as an outcome of the Six-Party Talks, emphatically pointed out, “The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”[19]

 

Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war. Although the worldwide Cold War has long ended, the one on the peninsula has been exacerbated. North Korea on one side and the U.S.-ROK alliance on the other are implementing similar deterrent strategies so that a mutual deterrence structure has emerged. That is to say, the present peace and “no war” are based on “mutual deterrence” and even a “balance of threat” that assures mutual destruction. This security structure, reminiscent of the Cold War, constitutes the reason why North Korea insists on the development of nuclear weapons.

 

The above two abnormal situations are the root causes of the peninsula’s constant state of crisis and the lack of peace and stability. If they remain unchanged, the North Korean nuclear issue will not be solved and the peninsula will not be able to escape the vicious circle of periodic crises. Thus, any attempts to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue must take into consideration these two root causes.

 

As mentioned above, China and the United States have common goals and interests in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while their respective foreign policies are different due to their distinctive judgments on the root causes of the issue and their responses accordingly.

 

As a matter of fact, the North Korean nuclear issue covers more than nuclear proliferation and nuclear threat; it is a product of the long-term military confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as an outcome of serious imbalance in the security structure of the peninsula since the end of the Cold War. For North Korea, the issue is basically about survival and security. This complicated security issue shaped by the long-standing state of war in the form of a cold war cannot be addressed simply by carrying out the model of “denuclearization in exchange for compensation”, nor through isolation, sanctions or military strikes. Instead, the relevant parties should agree on a package of plans in accordance with the September 19 Joint Statement in order to build a new security relationship on the peninsula, realize the normalization of relations between the two sides, and establish a peace and cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. Only through these efforts can the North Korean nuclear issue be solved and can the peninsula become a nuclear-free area with long-term stability.

 

Therefore, the point of departure of effective cooperation between China and the United States on the issue is how to carry out a package of plans to comprehensively resolve it and build a permanent peace regime according to the “commitment for commitment, action for action” principle[20] included in the September 19 Joint Statement. These attempts will also provide basis for China and the United States to narrow their differences and play more positive roles in achieving a peaceful settlement of the issue. In fact, the framework of the Six-Party Talks serves as a practical and effective platform for both countries to expand cooperation and narrow differences on the North Korean nuclear issue.

 

 

 Source: China International Studies, May/June 2015, pp. 51-67.


 


[1]Yang Xiyu is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies.

Since the first round of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue in 2003, China and the United States have reiterated the importance of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the role of the Six-Party Talks as the only feasible way to reach a peaceful settlement of the issue at both presidential meetings and the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In the China-U.S. Joint Statement issued after the meeting of the two heads of state in January 2011, the aforementioned stand was reaffirmed. Refer to China-U.S. Joint Statement, Xinhuanet, January 20, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-01/20/c_121001428.htm

 

[2]“South Korea Special Weapons”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok.

 

[3] After high-level negotiations, the two sides of the Korean Peninsula reached the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the DPRK and the ROK in December 1991. On February 19, 1992, the two sides signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Refer to History of South-North Relations, website of the Ministry of Unification of the ROK, http://www.cn.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=108; and Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, website of the UN, http://www.un.org/chinese/focus/dprk/1992.htm, December 19, 2014.

 

[4]Joint Announcement of the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Administration of Customs and the IAEA, No. 59 of 2013, the General Administration of Customs of the PRC, September 28, 2013. http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab49659/info693395.htm, February 25, 2015.

 

[5]Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Xinhuanet, September 19, 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-09/19/content_3511768.htm, December 19, 2014.

 

[6]Michael R. Gordon, “Back from Korea, Carter Declares the Crisis Is Over”, The New York Times, June 20, 1994, Page A1; Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

 

[7] Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1994, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf. December 20, 2014.

 

[8]Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, January 2008, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Negotiating_with_North_Korea_1992-2007.pdf.December 20, 2014.

 

[9]U.S.-DPRK. Joint Communiqué, U.S. Department of State, October 12, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html. December 20, 2014.

 

[10] “U.S. Relations with North Korea”, U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm. December 20, 2014.

 

[11] Ibid.

 

[12] “North Korea said talks with the U.S. laid foundation for the Six-Party Talks”, Xinhuanet, September 3, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/03/content_6656787.htm; U.S. Relations with North Korea, U.S. Department of State.

 

[13]  “U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Discussions”, U.S. Department of State, February 29, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184869.htm. February 27, 2015.

 

[14]William Wan, “Clinton Issues Challenges on N. Korea”, The Washington Post, July 24, 2011, Page A16.

 

[15] “Obama says Internet, not force or sanctions, will bring down N. Korea,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-8E1vLaXPE.February 27, 2015.

 

[16] “Executive Order--Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea,” the White House, January 2, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/02/executive-order-imposing-additional-sanctions-respect-north-korea. January 13, 2015.

 

[17]China-U.S. Joint Statement, Xinhuanet, January 20, 2011.

 

[18] “Kim Jong-il met with Albright”, People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), December 24, 2000, page 6; “Albright Makes Historic Visit to North Korea,” The Guardian, October 23, 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/23/northkorea. December 20, 2014.

 

[19] Refer to Article 4, Joint Statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks.

 

[20] Refer to Article 5, Joint Statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks.

 

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