Strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in Obama’s New Term and US Ideological Export

China International Studies | 作者: Fang Guangshun, Ma Qiang | 时间: 2014-11-21 | 责编: Li Minjie
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  Fang Guangshun & Ma Qiang 

 

 

Since the beginning of his second term, Barack Obama has made some adjustment to US strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The adjustment is aimed at adapting the US to the new features in the post-financial crisis era, the new developments in the Asia-Pacific situation and the new changes in the overall US strategy, and it also serves US strategic intentions to dominate the regional affairs, acquire and safeguard its own interests and counterbalance China and prevent it from playing a leading role in the region. It is worth noting that the adjusted rebalance strategy features the purposefulness of US ideological export. The impact of the changes in the contents and means of ideological export on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region deserves attention.

 

US Rebalance Strategy and Its Adjustment

 

Obama’s first term was a period when the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific was put forward, developed and actively implemented. In early 2009, the Obama administration sped up the adjustment of foreign strategy based on the concept of “smart power”. Members of the ruling team visited Asia-Pacific countries for many times, stressing repeatedly the great significance of the Asia-Pacific to the US, which implied clearly the accelerated pace of US returning to the Asia-Pacific. In November 2011, Obama claimed in a speech to the Australian Parliament that “the United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay,” and he promised that the US would play “a larger and long-term role”, upholding peace, economic freedom and human rights. The speech did not clearly raised the concept of “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”, but because it was “a definitive statement of U.S. policy in the region; a clarion call for freedom; and yet another example of how, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is ‘all in’,” [1] it was widely regarded as “announcing the rebalance”. [2] In the same month, the then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published in Foreign Policy an article entitled “America’s Pacific Century”, announcing the US’ return to the Asia-Pacific in a high profile, and making a systematic and complete exposition of the contents of the new Asia-Pacific strategy. As a Chinese scholar understood, “US strategy of return to the Asia-Pacific includes political, military and economic aspects, that is, politically, carrying out ‘forward deployment diplomacy’, ‘multilateral diplomacy’, ‘value diplomacy’ and others; militarily, consolidating old friends and seeking new partners; and economically, seeking to lead the construction of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, building a regime for East Asian economic cooperation with the US at the center.” [3] In June 2012, the then Secretary of Defense Panetta delivered a speech in Shangri-La Dialogue entitled “The US rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific”, openly using for the first time the concept of “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, underscoring the role the US plays in the Asia-Pacific region and how to advance the new military strategy of rebalance , and pointing out that “ the US will transfer a batch of naval ships to the Asia-Pacific region before 2020 and 60% of US warships will be deployed in the Pacific by then.”[4]

The strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific was a significant adjustment of US foreign policy strategy in Obama’s first term, but this strategy was full of contradictions and problems from rhetoric to practice. First, the expression of the strategy varied constantly. There have been different expressions like “shift eastward of the strategic center of gravity”, “return to the Asia-Pacific”, “strategic pivot”, and “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”. The variability indicated that the Obama administration attached great importance to the Asia-Pacific region on the one hand, and on the other, failed to make precise and clear interpretations on its Asia-Pacific strategy. Second, pushed by the executive team represented by the mighty Secretary Clinton, the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific appeared aggressive, leading to tensions in regional security, and its apparent intention against China also raised China’s suspicion and concerns. Third, the strategy of rebalance over-emphasized security and economy in the course of implementation. Militarily, moves in the deployment and adjustment of forces were notable, and economically, the US powerfully advanced the TPP that excluded China.

Given that various problems emerged in the implementation of the rebalance strategy, the second-term Obama administration began to perfect the expression of the strategy and adjust the tactics of implementation. Secretary of State Kerry delivered in Tokyo a speech entitled “A 21st Century Pacific Partnership”, showing the determination of the US to continue implementing the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific:

 

President Obama made a smart and a strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia. My commitment to you is that as a Pacific nation that takes our Pacific partnership seriously, we will continue to build on our active and enduring presence.[5]

 

In a speech entitled “America’s Future in Asia”, National Security Advisor Rice summarized the goals of the strategy of US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific:

 

Ultimately, America’s purpose is to establish a more stable security environment in Asia, an open and transparent economic environment, and a liberal political environment that respects the universal rights and freedoms of all. Achieving that future will necessarily be the sustained work of successive administrations. In the near term, President Obama will continue to lay the critical foundations for lasting progress in four key areas—enhancing security, expanding prosperity, fostering democratic values, and advancing human dignity.[6]

 

As for the problem of underscoring conventional security in the implementation of the strategy of rebalance, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Baer stressed the importance of democracy and human rights to the strategy:

 

The role of political progress – in particular, of the advance of human rights and democracy—is less frequently a strand in the public discourse about the pivot. So the topic of this hearing helps fill a gap, and gives us an opportunity to consider important questions: Does the “rebalance,” as a purposeful addition to U.S. foreign policy, include progress on human rights and democracy as part of its objectives? And does progress—or lack thereof—on human rights and democratic governance affect the prospects of achieving the full range of objectives that motivate the broader “rebalance”? The questions are related, of course, and the answer to both is a firm yes.[7]

 

All these indicate that the second-term Obama administration will continue the rebalance strategy, and will further advance the strategy in the name of democracy and human rights on a balanced basis.

 

Ideological Export in the Rebalance Strategy

 

One of the distinctive features of the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is more emphasis on the great significance of ideological export to the strategy, more clarification of the contents of ideological export, and more vehicles and means to promote ideological export.

 

The great significance of ideological export

Among US foreign policy terms, ideology emerges as “value” in most cases. Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton highly appraised the status and role of “value diplomacy” in US Asia-Pacific strategy. “To the US, ‘value diplomacy’ has extraordinary significance. Promoting democracy and human rights is the foundation of US foreign policy and its national strategy, and is also the basis of the strategy of returning to East Asia.…Promoting American values will help to maintain peace and stability of East Asia from within, but the US will by the same token respect other countries’ choices.”[8] Acting Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun in his speech before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stressed that values including democracy and human rights are the fundamental issue binding together the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, indicating that,

 

While the rebalance reflects the importance the U.S. government places on our strategic and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific, the dimension that binds the entire strategy together is our strong support for advancing democracy and human rights.[9]

 

Ideological export or “value diplomacy” the US carries out against the backdrop of the strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is a crucial basis on which the US maintains relations with its Asia-Pacific allies, and also is an important premise on which the US can influence the value orientation of Asia-Pacific countries and build regional rules and institutional arrangements led by the US. Just as Kerry indicated in his speech in Tokyo,

 

Our alliance…is a global partnership, based on common values, with a strong bilateral security alliance and common approaches to regional and to global challenges. … And these shared values I respectfully say to you today should become the foundation of a new era of collaboration guided by clear rules of the road. Our Pacific Dream is to translate our strongest values into an unprecedented security, economic, and social cooperation.[10]

 

The goals of ideological export in US strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific can be summarized in three points: maintaining relations with traditional allies, imposing influence on emerging countries in the region and infiltrating China to influence its future direction.

 

The main contents of ideological export

As the foundation of US strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, value diplomacy serves primarily to achieve and maintain US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Its fundamental contents are the promotion of democracy, human rights, freedom and other “universal values”. Specifically, the focus is mainly placed on the issues of political democracy and freedom, and human rights issues including religion, minorities and cyberspace freedom.

Promoting political democracy and freedom is the first important aspect of ideological export in US rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As Rice indicated, “In the early years of this new century, we must help to consolidate and expand democracy across Asia to enable more and more people to participate fully in the political life of their countries.” [11] Base on this idea, the US successfully pushed Myanmar towards democracy by exerting influence on it. By imposing economic sanctions and political pressures, the US forced the junta to conduct general elections, which allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to return to the political arena of Myanmar. The US places high hope on the future development of Myanmar’s democracy: “If progress continues, by the end of President Obama’s second term, we hope to have helped Burma reestablish itself as a regional leader and a thriving, prosperous democracy.”[12] At the same time, the US further hopes to copy the “success story” of Myanmar to other countries to promote democratic values and practices in the Asia-Pacific region: “Blood and battle are not the only catalysts of change. Other countries can similarly choose to replicate the transitions of their neighbors. And they can do so peacefully, inspire the world, and join us in the Pacific community we’re building for the future.”[13] To achieve that goal, the US will “support those working to pry open the doors of democracy just a little wider….We will continue to help nations strengthen institutions to uphold justice and the rule of law and to meet the basic needs of their people.”[14]

Maintaining and promoting human rights is another important aspect of US ideological export. Human rights are always the core issue of US foreign policy. Just as Rice said,

 

It’s what our history and our values demand, but it’s also profoundly in our interests.…our commitment to democracy and human rights roundly reinforces our national security. The greatest threats to our security often emerge from countries with the worst human rights records.[15]

 

US focus on human rights issues in the Asia-Pacific region is concentrated on religion, minorities and cyberspace freedom in particular. On religion, Kerry claimed that,

 

Freedom of religion is a core American value. It’s one that helped to create our country.…But freedom of religion is not an American invention. It’s a universal value.…The promotion of international religious freedom is a priority for President Obama, and it is a priority for me as Secretary of State. I am making certain, and will continue to, that religious freedom remains an integral part of our global diplomatic engagement.[16]

 

On cyberspace issue, the US lifts cyberspace freedom and cyber-security to the level of human rights. Deputy Secretary of State Hormats clearly indicated that,

 

The U.S. Government strongly supports respect for freedom of expression, including on the internet. This goes back to the founding of our nation.…But we believe that free expression is not just an American right. It is a universal human right for the very reasons Jefferson described. And, this right applies in the virtual world just as it does in the real world.[17]

 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Baer indicated that “we must continue to make the case that human rights apply online as they do offline.”[18]

The US believes that the human rights situation in the Asia-Pacific region has still room for improvement, because

 

…the region also includes many hundreds of millions of people who have yet to experience protections for their universal human rights. It includes strongmen who manipulate flawed elections and suppress speech and expression in order to stay in power, and it includes places where the “rule of law” is notably absent and where members of religious and other minorities suffer abuses with impunity. It includes governments that treat the Internet as a new threat to be regulated and controlled rather than as a platform for free expression and opportunity.[19]

 

Regarding issues including minority, religion and cyberspace freedom, the US makes direct accusation and criticism on China and other countries.

 

Main vehicles and means of US ideological export

US ideological export in the Asia-Pacific region is achieved through various vehicles and means, including direct promotion by government institutions, activities organized by inter-governmental organizations led by the US, funding activities by related non-governmental organizations, exchange and cooperation programs in culture and education, activities around cyberspace freedom, and direct public pressure on related governments if necessary.

The State Department of the US and its overseas missions are the main force of US ideological export. In Obama’s second term, with value diplomacy getting more prominent in its rebalance strategy, the State Department newly appointed an Under Secretary of State for civilian security, democracy and human rights, and coordinated and integrated activities and programs of eight functional bureaus and offices. Meanwhile, the State Department strengthened cooperation with USAID and other government institutions, jointly promoting value diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. As Kerry stated,

 

The good work of the State Department, of USAID, is measured not only in the value of the dollar, but it’s also measured in our deepest values.…the brave employees of State and USAID – and the Diplomatic Security personnel who protect the civilians serving us overseas – work in some of the most dangerous places on Earth, and they do it fully cognizant that we share stronger partnerships with countries that share our commitment to democratic values and human rights.[20]

 

In addition, the US strengthened ideological export of values like democracy and human rights to the Asia-Pacific region by means of the Community of Democracies, the Open Government Partnership and other inter-governmental organizations and mechanisms for cooperation. In May 2013, the Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies decided to transform the mechanism into a platform for innovation and action to advance democracy and strengthen civil societies worldwide, while launching an action plan--the Asia Democracy Network. As the office of the spokesperson of US State Department claimed, the action plan is “a groundbreaking effort that will bring together democracy activists and policymakers throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”[21]

In addition, the US attaches importance on the crucial role played by civil society organizations and other non-governmental organizations in ideological export. As Rice said, “To support embattled civil society, which is the engine that drives greater transparency and accountability everywhere, including here in the United States we founded and are working through the Open Government Partnership to develop and share best practices.”[22] White House Office of the Press Secretary claimed that “the U.S. has also made outreach to civil society a cornerstone of its foreign policy. The State Department’s Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society has established civil society working groups at more than 40 U.S. diplomatic posts around the world.”[23]

At the operational level, US ideological export mainly includes the following means:

The first is to develop and carry out various cultural and educational exchange programs. For instance, the US-ASEAN Fulbright Program sponsoring scholars from ASEAN member states to visit the US, ASEAN Young Leaders Initiative that sponsors high school students and educators to visit the US, Ten Million Strong Study in China Foundation, and so on. Kerry commented on the Fulbright Program that “in the last two decades, a thousand Vietnamese students and scholars have studied and taught in America through the Fulbright program, including the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, who…has feelings about America because of that engagement.”[24]

The second is to fund activities carried out by civil society organizations. To preserve the space for civil society to operate, the U.S. funds programs that track and monitor legislations that restrict the work of civil society in more than 40 countries, and is making a new commitment of $3.5 million to expand and sustain this work. The United States is working through Lifeline: Embattled CSOs Assistance Fund to offer emergency financial assistance when civic groups are threatened. Since its founding in 2011, Lifeline has assisted 218 civil society organizations in 64 countries. The United States will provide $5 million over the next 5 years to augment this initiative.[25] As Rice indicated,

 

The State Department led the creation of the Lifeline Partnership, which provides emergency assistance to civil society organizations. We are reaching out directly to all of you in the NGO community to learn about how we can best support and train your sister organizations around the world.[26]

 

The third is to strongly advocate cyberspace freedom. US State Department strongly stressed the importance of freedom of speech in cyberspace in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: “Unrestricted reporting by the media—in all its emerging forms —has never been more vital to the functioning of democratic societies.”[27] Under the Obama Administration, the United States has made defending internet freedom a central component of support for civil society. For example, the United States supports the Digital Defenders Partnership, which provides emergency assistance for activists, bloggers, citizen journalists, and ordinary citizens who have been harassed, threatened, or arrested for discussing democracy and human rights issues online, and has invested over $14 million to strengthen civil society’s capacity to advocate laws and policies that facilitate unfettered internet access.[28]

The fourth is to directly condemn related countries and impose pressure on them. When other means can’t play a role, or the US believes that the behavior of a certain country violates the universal values of so-called democracy and freedom, it will directly impose accusation, even sanctions on that country, expecting changes to occur in that country in line with US requirements by imposing pressure. As Rice indicated clearly in her speech,

 

Wherever President Obama goes, he speaks both publicly and privately to highlight human rights abuses and to help nations see that protecting the rights of their people is ultimately in their self-interest. We use the unmatched strength of our economy to apply financial pressure, including sanctions, on those that violate human rights. We leverage our military aid and other forms of bilateral support to encourage countries to live up to their international commitments.[29]

 

The Nature of US Ideological Export and the Responding Policies

 

Ideological export is the consistent theme of US foreign policy

It is the constant theme of US foreign policy to carry out ideological export by promoting to the world universal values with democracy, freedom and human rights as the main contents. The constancy is not only due to US historical and religious background, but also driven by realistic national interests of the US. US ideological export, like its foreign policy, is a mixture of idealism and realism, but the US has one essential goal, that is, to promote its own values worldwide to be prevailing universal values. Just as Baer said,

 

The advance of human rights and democracy has long been an established objective of U.S. foreign policy through administrations of both parties.…The underlying truths haven’t changed: human rights and democracy are foundational to our foreign policy because they are foundational to our polity; and because U.S. national interests will be most durably met by a world in which states are part of a stable rules-based order. That stable order can only be grounded on the durable peace that human rights and democratic governance deliver.[30]

 

Characteristics of ideological export

The second-term Obama administration made an adjustment to the rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific, stressing the coordinated advance of the strategy in economic, political and security fields. Against this backdrop, flexibility, diversity and elusiveness are becoming the characteristics of US ideological export to the Asia-Pacific region.

The so-called flexibility means that the ideological export is conducted through various actors. It occurs sometimes in the form of official programs, sometimes in the form of inter-governmental organizations or semi-inter-governmental organizations, and sometimes in the form of activities carried out by the so-called civil society organizations. Depending on different objective conditions and the need of the situation, the US can flexibly switch among the three forms and coordinate them.

The so-called diversity means that the ideological export can be mixed with different issues and manifest varied forms in different areas, from traditional politics and economy to environmental protection and cyberspace freedom. As long as suitable conditions and differences of interests groups in the society exist, they can be targets and fulcrums of ideological export.

The so-called elusiveness means that ideological export will be advanced in a relatively hidden and understated way. As a Chinese commentary observed,

 

The second-phase value diplomacy might be softer, turning from dialogues on human rights and other values facing governments to grassroots interactions facing local communities advanced in parallel. With regards to communication with local NGOs, opinion leaders and political opposition, the US has a systematic and convenient interface for it to make smooth communication, so as to closely grasp, even “guide”, the situation of the local communities. The US will increasingly attach importance to striving for public opinion in a non-confrontational way, promoting changes of local societies unconsciously, thus putting pressure on governments.[31]

 

China’s counter measures

A Chinese scholar argued that “US strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is not equal to its China strategy, but the strategic context of its China strategy. It covers China strategy and directs its main spearhead to China.”[32] In that sense, China is definitely the main target of US ideological export in the context of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. We must have a full and clear understanding of it and actively take measures to cope with it.

First, we should keep high vigilance in heart and mind. As mentioned above, compared with economy and traditional security, ideological export has characteristics of flexibility, diversity and elusiveness, which makes it difficult to accurately identify its nature, and its danger often lies in that. As Xi Jinping indicated,

 

Ideological work is very important to the Party. It concerns the Party’s fate, the long-term stability of the nation and national cohesion and solidarity whether or not ideological work can be done well. We must strengthen the guiding role of Marxism in the field of ideology.[33]

 

We must recognize the persistence, complexity and arduousness of the struggle for ideological dominance under Xi’s guidance, and put his requirement into specific practice.

Second, we should actively and positively respond to US ideological export, without fear or evasion. It is an objective reality that the US, relying on its strong economic strength and cultural advantages, is vigorously carrying out ideological export to China and its neighboring countries with the aid of a variety of exchange activities at official and non-official levels. While keeping vigilant, we must cope with it with a good mentality, instead of fear or evasion. Today’s world is an open world. China has opened its door for exchange and cooperation. We cannot change the posture of exchange and cooperation with the outside world because of US ideological export; it is much less likely to return to a closed state. Instead, on the one hand, we must grasp general principles and policies during the course of opening up for exchange and cooperation, and take the initiative. On the other hand, we should have enough cultural and institutional self-confidence to face US ideological export. As exchange is two-way and interactive, we are not necessarily pegged in the passive position in the course of exchange.

Third, we should actively cope with US ideological export from the perspective of transforming China’s foreign strategy. US ideological export is not only one of the most important subjects of its global foreign policy strategy, but also an important component of its strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and a long-term principle for its China strategy. Therefore, we should have a broader international perspective to cope with US ideological export, standing on the level of China-US strategic relations and coping with US strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Given this, in terms of foreign strategy, we should continue to actively promote the building of a new model of major power relations between China and the US connoting “no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation”. “Mutual respect” should include acknowledging and respecting differences in social systems, values and ideologies between China and the US. Its significance lies in making the US recognize that, as a Chinese scholar said,

 

Ideology has national differences, having no fixed one-size-fits-all paradigm. Traditional thinking drawing lines according to ideology has been unable to adapt to the development of the times. Instead, the expansion of shared knowledge between countries helps to eliminate misunderstandings, resolve contradictions and maximize national interests.[34]

 

We should make the US understand the existence of realistic differences in terms of ideology, thus lowering its expectation with regards to the effectiveness of its ideological export.

 

 

 

 

 



[1] The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “National Security Advisor Donilon on Asia-Pacific in 2013,” March 11, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/03/20130311143926.html.

 

[2] Daniel Baer, “State’s Baer on US ‘Rebalance’ to Asia Pacific,” March 21, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/03/20130321144581.html.

 

[3] Jin Canrong, “The Impact of ‘US Strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ on Sino-US Relations,” Northeast Asian Forum, Vol. 5, 2013.

 

[4] “Five Questions on US Strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: Can the Promises Be Met?” Xinhuanet, June 6, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-06/06/c_123238380.html.

 

[5] John Kerry, “Secretary Kerry on a 21st Century Pacific Partnership,” April 15, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130415145745.html.

 

[6] Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia,” November 20, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/11/20131120287258.html.

 

[7] Daniel Baer, “State’s Baer on US ‘Rebalance’ to Asia Pacific,” March 21, 2013.

 

[8] Jin Canrong, “The Impact of ‘US Strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ on Sino-US Relations,” Northeast Asian Forum, Vol. 5, 2013.

 

[9] Joseph Yun, “State’s Yun on Democracy, Human Rights and the ‘Asia Rebalance’,” March 21, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/03/20130321144568.html.

 

[10] John Kerry, “Secretary Kerry on a 21st Century Pacific Partnership,” April 15, 2013.

 

[11] Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia,” November 20, 2013.

 

[12] Ibid.

 

[13] John Kerry, “Secretary Kerry on a 21st Century Pacific Partnership,” April 15, 2013.

 

[14] Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia,” November 20, 2013.

 

[15] Susan Rice, “Security Advisor Rice on Advancing Human Rights,” December 4, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/12/20131204288345.html.

 

[16] John Kerry, “Kerry on 2012 International Religious Freedom Report,” May 20, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/chinese/texttrans/2013/05/20130521147743.html.

 

[17] Robert Hormats, “State’s Hormats at U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum,” April 9, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130410145567.html.

 

[18] Daniel Baer, “Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of the Asia Rebalance—State’s Baer on U.S. “Rebalance” to Asia-Pacific Region,” March 21, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/03/20130321144581.html.

 

[19] Ibid.

 

[20] John Kerry, “Kerry on US Foreign Policy,” Feb. 20, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/02/20130220142812.html.

 

[21] US State Department, “Key Facts on Community of Democracies Meeting in Mongolia,”April 30, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130430146607.html.

 

[22] Susan Rice, “Human Rights: Advancing American Interests and Values,” Remarks at the Human Rights First Annual Summit, December 4, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/12/20131204288345.html.

 

[23] White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Support for Civil Society,” Sept. 23, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/09/20130923283380.html.

 

[24] John Kerry, “Kerry on US Foreign Policy,” Feb. 20, 2013.

 

[25] White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Support for Civil Society,” Sept. 23, 2013.

 

[26] Susan Rice, “Human Rights: Advancing American Interests and Values,” Remarks at the Human Rights First Annual Summit, December 4, 2013.

 

[27] IIP Digital, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012, April 19, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130419146142.html.

 

[28] White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Support for Civil Society,” Sept. 23, 2013.

 

[29] Susan Rice, “Human Rights: Advancing American Interests and Values,” Remarks at the Human Rights First Annual Summit, December 4, 2013.

 

[30] Daniel Baer, “Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of the Asia Rebalance—State’s Baer on U.S. “Rebalance” to Asia-Pacific Region,” March 21, 2013.

 

[31] “US Strategy of Rebalance to Asia-Pacific Enters Second Phase,” Oriental Morning, Dec. 26, 2013.

 

[32] Yu Zhengliang, “Imbalance of US strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” Study of International Relations, No.2, 2013.

 

[33] “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech on August 19,” CPC NewsNet, Aug. 23, 2013. http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0823/c164113-22677195.html.

 

[34] Chen Jimin, “How to Understand the New Type of Relations Between China and the US?” June 8, 2013. http://comments.caijing.com.cn/2013-06-08/112890239.html.

 

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